When the Underwriters Blinked: What the Hormuz Insurance Crisis Really Means photo

A viral post on social media claimed that Donald Trump had "killed the British Empire" in just a few minutes. However, the reality is much more complicated and, in some ways, more significant.

According to Paul Morgan (gCaptain), the fundamental story is true. When US and Israeli forces carried out coordinated strikes on Iran in late February 2026, Tehran responded by closing the Strait of Hormuz entirely. This was not just a military issue but an economic one.

In less than three days, major marine insurance companies like Gard, Skuld, North-Standard, and the London P&I Club announced the cancellation of war risk extensions for ships entering the Persian Gulf. This caused transit volumes through the strait, which is crucial for about 20% of the world’s oil supply, to drop by over 80% almost immediately. The closure was not caused by physical barriers like mines but by a decision that was made on paper.

Trump reacted in his typical style, using Truth Social to state that the US International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) would "immediately" offer political risk insurance for all maritime trade in the Gulf at a "very reasonable price." He also mentioned that the US Navy would provide protection for tankers passing through Hormuz "if necessary," signaling that the US was stepping up to fill the gap.

While this part of the story is confirmed, the viral post got several key points wrong, which are important for a complete understanding of the situation.

First, the claim that Lloyd's of London is "the only company in the world big enough to insure all the oil tankers" misunderstands how marine insurance works. Lloyd's is a marketplace rather than a single insurer and plays a leading role in a complex system that includes P&I clubs and reinsurance pools around the world. While Lloyd's handles a significant portion of war risk insurance globally, it was not solely responsible for pulling coverage in the Gulf.

The cancellations were initiated by the P&I clubs, which acted after losing their reinsurance support. This is a critical distinction: the issue stemmed from market failures related to regulations, not a single strategic decision from Lloyd's.

In fact, Sheila Cameron, the chief executive of the Lloyd's Market Association, welcomed Trump's engagement with the DFC and noted that most of the nearly 1,000 vessels stranded in Gulf waters still had coverage through the London market. Coverage had not been entirely canceled, but it had become too costly and uncertain.

The viral post also mentioned figures about Lloyd's influence on British GDP and job numbers, stating that it represented 2% of the UK’s economy and supported 50,000 jobs. While these numbers are roughly accurate, they represent the entire London commercial insurance market, not just Lloyd's. Furthermore, suggesting that the withdrawal of war risk cover was a deliberate move against Trump lacks evidence; it was a technical response to challenges in the market.

The assertion that Lloyd's geopolitical power dates back to "the 1600s" has some truth, as the coffee house where the market originated opened in 1688, but suggesting it was part of a coordinated anti-Trump effort is a stretch.

Trump's DFC intervention is significant but incomplete. The DFC is a federal agency tasked with offering political risk insurance, and its coverage limit was around $205 billion by late 2025. Analysts estimatethe total insurance needed for ships in the Persian Gulf to be about $352 billion, which is more than what the DFC can provide. If claims arise on a large scale, Congress may need to step in to address the shortfall.

The promise of US Navy escorts comes with its own caveats. Officials recently informed tanker executives that no escorts were immediately available and future provisions were uncertain. The area of threat extends roughly 1,000 nautical miles from Kuwait to Duqm. With a third of the US fleet already engaged in missions in the region, committing to escort tankers is not an easy task.

Despite these complexities, the DFC's action is still important. It sets a new precedent for a US government agency becoming a last-resort insurer for global energy trade. This is reminiscent of Operation Earnest Will in 1987, when the US provided naval protection for Kuwaiti tankers during the Iran-Iraq Tanker War, a move that helped maintain oil exports but required delicate diplomatic handling. However, this does not mean the London insurance market is simply going to be replaced overnight. The LMA is working with Washington to find a coordinated solution, and brokers like Marsh are in discussions about a public-private approach to enhance rather than replace current market capabilities, similar to arrangements made for grain exports from Ukraine’s Black Sea ports in 2023.

The crisis in the Strait of Hormuz has revealed a weak point that has long been acknowledged but never fully addressed: a fragile layer of trust in private institutions can be withdrawn within days, significantly affecting the flow of global energy. Trump's quick response was necessary, considering rising pressures on US fuel prices. Whether this ultimately changes marine insurance geopolitics, or merely buys time for the London market to recalibrate, will depend on the length of the ongoing conflict.

The British Empire wasn't dismantled last week, but the insurance industry's belief that it could remain above geopolitical conflicts, pricing risks from London while staying detached, has certainly been shaken.