America constructs less than 1% of commercial ships. The White House's Maritime Action Plan relies on vessel fees, a trust fund, and designated zones, but the real hurdle lies with Congress.
By Captain John Konrad The United States manufactures under one percent of the world’s commercial vessels. Currently, eleven shipyards are able to build ships, with eight of them capable of constructing vessels longer than 400 feet. The supply chain has streamlined so much that many essential parts now come from just one supplier. Moreover, almost all trade carried by sea in the U.S. is done using ships that are built, crewed, and flagged by foreign countries.
President Trump’s Maritime Action Plan (MAP), unveiled recently, represents the most ambitious effort to counter this trend since the Merchant Marine Act of 1936. This plan was originally due 100 days ago as part of a maritime executive order signed on April 9, 2025, which set a November deadline for its completion. However, it took 310 days to finalize. The lengthy delay highlights the complexity of the undertaking. The MAP spans 35 pages and offers substantial content. Notably, it was not signed by the Secretary of Transportation, but by Marco Rubio as National Security Advisor and Russell Vought as OMB Director, indicating that this is viewed as a national security issue rather than just a transport policy matter.
“We will soon revitalize our once-great shipyards with hundreds of billions of dollars in new investments and people from around the world…to build ships in America,” stated President Trump in the introduction to the plan. “We want them built in America.”
However, a plan does not equate to an operational shipyard. The gap between them is vast and involves years of planning, billions of dollars, and the willingness of Congress to fund the proposals laid out by the White House.
This plan is detailed and well-articulated, but agencies like the Maritime Administration are significantly understaffed, while others, like NAVSEA in the Navy, are considerably overstaffed. The key question is whether the objectives are overly ambitious and, if they are achievable, how long will it take to accomplish them?
The MAP is built on four main pillars, but the core of the plan revolves around several policy tools that, if implemented, could drastically change the economics of American shipbuilding. The document aims not just to increase the number of vessels built in the U.S., but to recreate a maritime industrial base that can operate independently. This distinction is critical; it is not merely a program to subsidize a few additional ships but a comprehensive attempt to revive an entire industrial ecosystem that includes shipyards, suppliers, workforce, and design capabilities, which can flourish on its own after government support is withdrawn. As mentioned, it is an ambitious undertaking.
Three key aspects of the MAP’s approach stand out. First, the unprecedented scale of proposed government investment and intervention, which is typically avoided by Republicans. Second, it requires coordination among various agencies, including the OMB, NSC, Maritime Administration (MARAD), the Coast Guard, the Army Corps of Engineers, and even foreign governments. Third, the plan includes numerous deregulatory actions: a significant portion is dedicated to removing outdated regulations, simplifying compliance, clarifying policies, lowering mandatory requirements for able seamen, and revising training standards for merchant mariners based on international conventions. The MAP aims to reduce bureaucratic hurdles as aggressively as it proposes spending, with the deregulatory aspects being among the most meticulous in the document.
The industrial strategy proposed is specific. The MAP advocates for multi-year contracts for multiple ships to provide shipyards with stable order books. It promotes using modular production, digital engineering, and AI. Additionally, it requires that all performance specifications and design plans are fully defined before production starts, and that commercially available designs are utilized when feasible. A notable emphasis is placed on reducing time to parts and hulls, indicating a focus on production efficiency rather than bureaucratic processes.
The most significant proposal in the MAP is a fee on every foreign-built vessel entering U.S. ports, based on the weight of imported tonnage. The plan estimates that at one cent per kilogram, this could generate about $66 billion over ten years; at 25 cents per kilogram, the total could reach approximately $1.5 trillion. This wide range indicates it's more of a negotiating stance than a fixed figure, and the actual amount agreed upon will affect the plan’s viability as a financial strategy. It remains uncertain whether the administration can implement this without Congressional help. The revenue could finance a new Maritime Security Trust Fund, originally suggested in the SHIPs Act, which would provide a crucial, dedicated funding stream that American shipbuilding has previously lacked. Without this fund, much of what’s proposed could end up being a wishlist pending annual funding that may not materialize.
The second main feature is the establishment of Maritime Prosperity Zones, or 100 designated areas across coasts, Great Lakes, river systems, Alaska, Hawaii, and U.S. territories. These zones would attract private investment with tax advantages aimed at shipyards, supply chain companies, workforce training, and advanced manufacturing. This concept is modeled on Opportunity Zones that emerged from the 2017 tax reform. If designed effectively, MPZs could channel private investment into maritime industrial sectors, similar to how Opportunity Zones impacted real estate. However, if poorly executed, they risk becoming mere tax shelters under a maritime label. The success will depend on the specific eligibility requirements and enforcement measures to be determined by the Secretary of Commerce and future legislation.
Thirdly, the MAP suggests extending the Capital Construction Fund, a successful tax-deferral tool that has allowed vessel owners to reinvest in new ships for years, to shipyard operators as well. With billions already in vessel-owner CCF accounts, this mechanism is proven to work. Extending it to shipyards would enable them to defer earnings toward infrastructure, equipment, and modernization efforts. This is a smart and overdue step.
Lastly, the MAP introduces what is termed the “Bridge Strategy,” designed to tackle the challenge of rebuilding from almost nothing. Under this concept, allied shipbuilders would create the initial hulls of a multi-vessel contract in their own facilities while simultaneously investing in U.S. shipyards that they own or have partnered with. Eventually, more of the hull construction would shift to American facilities. During a press call, officials highlighted the Finland icebreaker project as an example where Finnish shipbuilding expertise would come to the U.S. for building Arctic Security Cutters. If this approach can be scaled up to include Korean and Japanese shipyards, it might enable ships to be produced while American manufacturing capacity catches up.
These four components—the vessel fee, the Trust Fund, the MPZs, and the Bridge Strategy—form the backbone of the plan. However, the supporting framework is also crucial. Critics have pointed out that limited progress has been made public following Rodolphe Saadé, CEO of CMA CGA, expressing interest in investing $20 billion in U.S.-flagged ships. The MAP also proposes a new Strategic Commercial Fleet for international routes, expanded cargo preferences, reforms to Title XI loan guarantees, and implementing a land port maintenance tax on goods entering the U.S. through land borders. It calls for updating the U.S. Coast Guard Yard in Baltimore and modernizing the US Merchant Marine Academy, which it notes requires urgent improvements. Additionally, the MAP includes an Arctic maritime strategy and considerations for autonomous vessels, acknowledging the lack of established procedures for assessing AI-driven navigation decisions. As stated, it is indeed ambitious.