M/V Dali shipbuilder HD Hyundai said that changes made after the ship was delivered bypassed important safety measures, leading to a second blackout that left the vessel without power or steering just before it hit the bridge.

HD Hyundai Heavy Industries has defended the original design of the M/V Dali after the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigated the ship’s collision with the Francis Scott Key Bridge in Baltimore. The accident, which occurred on March 26, 2024, resulted in the deaths of six highway workers and caused the bridge to collapse.

The NTSB found that the likely cause of the collision was a loss of electrical power due to a loose signal wire connection caused by incorrect installation of wire labels. This disconnection caused the ship to lose both propulsion and steering near the bridge. The agency has recommended that HD Hyundai Heavy Industries incorporate proper wire-label installation methods into its procedures.

In its statement, the South Korean shipbuilder highlighted that the M/V Dali was delivered with multiple backup systems and features designed to automatically restart to prevent serious failures. The company noted that container ships like the M/V Dali operate like "floating cities," equipped with onboard power plants and built with protections to manage the challenges of operating complex systems in harsh conditions.

According to HD Hyundai, the ship initially had four separate diesel generators, two independent transformers, and automatic fuel supply pumps that were set to restart on their own after a power loss. These safety measures are mandated by relevant classification societies.

However, the company claims that after acquiring the ship, the owner and operator compromised these safety features. Specifically, HD Hyundai argues that they replaced the automatic fuel pumps with a manually operated flushing pump, which was not designed for fuel supply and lacked the necessary safety features.

The company stated, "Using the flushing pump as a fuel supply pump sacrificed both redundancy and automation of the fuel supply system and violated established safety regulations."

On the day of the incident, the vessel suffered two blackouts. The first occurred when a wire disconnected from a terminal block in the transformer system. Because the transformer was in manual mode, the crew had to switch to a backup transformer manually. However, during this process, they didn’t restart the flushing pump that was supposed to supply fuel to the active generators. This led to another blackout when the generators ran out of fuel, according to HD Hyundai.

HD Hyundai argued that if the ship's systems had been used correctly, "power would have been restored within seconds, and the second blackout that led to the tragedy would not have occurred."

The NTSB also pointed out issues with the ship's operations. They found that while the crew's operation of the flushing pump during the first blackout was not the direct cause, it was inappropriate because it wouldn’t automatically restore the necessary fuel pressure for two of the diesel generators after a blackout.

The NTSB's report clarified that since the flushing pump did not restart after the initial blackout, it failed to provide pressurized fuel to the generators, resulting in the second blackout. They also criticized Synergy, the operator of the Dali, for insufficient operational oversight.

The NTSB mentioned that routine inspections over the past ten years could have caught the loose wire, while HD Hyundai insisted that it was the shipowner and operator's responsibility to perform regular inspections and maintenance to keep the ship seaworthy.

Additionally, the NTSB identified other contributing factors beyond the ship’s systems, such as a lack of safety measures on the bridge and inadequate communication to warn highway workers to evacuate. The agency issued urgent recommendations to various federal agencies and bridge owners across the country to evaluate risks and implement safety strategies.

In conclusion, HD Hyundai stated that, "The M/V Dali shipowner and operator misused the vessel’s systems and failed to meet their inspection and maintenance responsibilities. Their shortcuts and violations of safety regulations ultimately caused this tragic incident."

The company expressed its condolences to the families affected and committed to collaborating with authorities to prevent similar incidents in the future.