A mechanical issue left a cargo ship in the Bass Strait without steering for over eight hours. The crew couldn't use a backup steering system because the captain had not been properly trained to operate it, according to a report released on Tuesday by the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB).
This incident happened late on July 23, 2025, when the 44.6-meter mixed cargo ship Matthew Flinders III was traveling from Bridport, Tasmania, to Lady Barron on Flinders Island, carrying fertilizer and farm equipment. About four nautical miles north of Waterhouse Island, an alarm for the autopilot went off after the ship's rudders jammed hard to the left, causing the vessel to turn uncontrollably in rough seas.
The crew initially struggled to find out what caused the steering problem while the ship rolled heavily in a two-meter swell. They disconnected the hydraulic steering from the rudder crossbar, manually centered the rudders, and used the twin propellers' differential thrust to regain some control and stay away from the coast. The ship, first headed towards Flinders Island, then turned back to Bridport while the crew continued to troubleshoot. About eight hours later, the chief engineer discovered a loose linkage arm on the rudder angle sensor, secured it, and restored the steering. The vessel then continued its journey to Lady Barron without further issues.
The ATSB found that the loose linkage arm caused the autopilot to lose feedback on the rudder angle, disabling both the autopilot and manual steering modes. However, investigators confirmed that the ship's non-follow-up "toggle steering" backup system was fully operational during the incident.
“The toggle steering system was available throughout the incident and was engaged by the engineer to try to regain rudder control,” said ATSB Chief Commissioner Angus Mitchell. “However, the captain was not familiar with the toggle steering controls on the bridge and could not regain steering.”
The investigation concluded that training for new crew members did not sufficiently cover the backup steering system. The vessel’s safety management system also lacked clear instructions for the non-follow-up controls, the toggle switches on the bridge were unlabeled, and emergency steering procedures were not posted. Moreover, emergency steering drills had not been conducted at the required three-month intervals, and those that took place did not include the backup steering operations. Consequently, the captain had never participated in an emergency steering drill prior to the incident.
After the incident, operator Bass Strait Freight updated its crew training and onboarding process, introduced competency assessments for new officers, and displayed simplified steering changeover procedures in the bridge and engine room. While the ATSB noted these steps as positive, it issued a formal safety recommendation for further improvements to the company's emergency steering procedures and safety management system.
“Shipping companies must ensure clear and simple instructions and procedures are part of their safety management systems," Mitchell emphasized. “This is especially crucial for ships with unique designs or operational characteristics, and for operators who frequently hire temporary crew.”