A tragic fire in the engine room of the dredging vessel Stuyvesant last November highlighted important lessons about maintenance and machinery startup practices, according to a recent investigation by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB).

The fire occurred on November 2, 2024, in the St. Johns River near Jacksonville, Florida, resulting in one death and an estimated $18 million in damages to the 392-foot-long dredger. The victim, a crew member who was in the machinery control room when the fire broke out, was rescued by the onboard emergency team but later died at a local hospital.

The investigation revealed that the fire was caused by a series of failures during what should have been routine maintenance. The NTSB identified the likely cause as "lube oil spraying from an auxiliary diesel engine (generator) and igniting off a nearby running diesel engine," stemming from crew members' failure to reinstall a plug after maintenance and not thoroughly inspecting the engine before starting it.

Before the fire, the crew had just finished maintenance on one of the vessel's two 2,442-horsepower Caterpillar 3512C auxiliary diesel engines, where they changed fuel and lube oil filters and replaced the lube oil. However, investigators found that the plug for the engine's lube oil filter had not been put back—it was later discovered on a nearby storage cabinet.

When the first engineer started the engine remotely from the machinery control room, pressurized lube oil sprayed from the open filter housing onto the hot exhaust surfaces of a running main engine below, which were operating at temperatures between 614°F and 742°F—well above the ignition point for lube oil. Flames ignited in less than a minute after the engine was started.

A major factor in the incident was the decision to start the engine remotely instead of locally. The NTSB report pointed out, "If the engine had been started locally, a crew member would have been near the engine during the start-up, allowing them to notice the low lube oil discharge from the open port at the top of the filter housing and take action to prevent the start."

The report stressed the importance of starting engines locally after maintenance because it allows crew members to verify that the engine is functioning correctly, with no visible leaks or unusual noises that might require stopping the engine.

The investigation found that several maintenance protocols were not followed as per the manufacturer's guidelines. In addition to the missing plug, the lube oil filler cap was also left open. Most notably, crew members skipped a recommended walk-around inspection before starting the engine.

The NTSB indicated that disruptions during maintenance may have led to these oversights. The engineering crew intended to carry out the work the previous day but delayed due to time constraints. On the day of the fire, one team member had left due to illness, changing the dynamics of the three-person maintenance team.

"A disruption during a job requiring sequential tasks can lead to steps being overlooked, especially in teams where individual roles are not clearly defined," the report stated.

The crew's quick emergency response likely prevented a worse situation. The port auxiliary engine was stopped about 2.5 minutes after the fire started, cutting off the primary fuel supply. The chief engineer shut down the main engines at 2:39 PM, reducing heat, and when those engines stopped, the shaft generators also ceased power production, cutting off ventilation fans and lowering the oxygen level in the engine room.

When the ship's emergency team arrived in the engine room around 2:57 PM, they found no active flames. After confirming the area was secure, they activated the vessel's fixed CO2 fire extinguishing system.

In response to the incident, the vessel's operator, The Dutra Group, has made significant procedural changes. They now require that engines be started locally after any maintenance and that two crew members inspect equipment before starting any engines.

The Stuyvesant, constructed in 1982 by Avondale Shipyard in New Orleans, was operating with a crew of 22 at the time of the incident. The auxiliary engines involved in the fire had been installed in December 2022, replacing older engines that had reached the end of their service life.

The NTSB's findings emphasize a crucial principle in marine engineering: "After maintenance on engine room machinery, thorough inspection is essential to ensure everything is functioning properly and all components have been reinstalled correctly."